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  • All news regarding Xen and XCP-ng ecosystem

    145 Topics
    5k Posts
    F
    @andriy.sultanov Running it now shows no error! And no output so looks like i have no issues!
  • Everything related to the virtualization platform

    1k Topics
    15k Posts
    J
    @poddingue I'm in agreement with all of this. I can clearly see the Intel card starting at slot 81 and ending at 84. Unfortunately, in XCP-ng 8.3, only 83 (the "gpu" itself) is visible as an assignable PCI pass-through device. When I pass through just slot 83, I get a dysfunctional result. Again...I'm a little out of my expertise here, but my assumption here is that in order to actually get the full GPU to work, I need to get slots 81-84 passed over to the VM. Problem...In XCP-ng 8.2, you could mask off PCI devices with the pciback.hide function: /opt/xensource/libexec/xen-cmdline --set-dom0 "xen-pciback.hide=(0000:04:01.0)(0000:00:19.0)" Or in my case: /opt/xensource/libexec/xen-cmdline --set-dom0 "xen-pciback.hide=(0000:81:00.0)(0000:82.01.0)(0000:82:02.0)(0000:83:00.0)(0000:84:00.0)" Then you would assign those same PCI devices to the guest VM. In 8.3 you do this with an xe command: xe pci-list and xe pci-disable-dom0-access uuid=<pci uuid> The bridge devices for the Intel card aren't being included in the pci-list of XCP-ng and are therefore not assignable to guests. For example, running "xe pci-list" on a host shows me this single entry relevant to the Intel card: uuid ( RO) : f3e6842b-ad1b-9e93-dbea-214dde28618a vendor-name ( RO): Intel Corporation device-name ( RO): Device e212 pci-id ( RO): 0000:83:00.0 With the new 8.3 method of assigning PCI resources to guest VM's, I don't see how I can fully pass-through the Intel GPU to a guest. I won't necessarily call this a "bug" but it is an unexpected and perhaps edge case behavior that Vates didn't expect.
  • 3k Topics
    29k Posts
    J
    @kagbasi-wgsdac said: @poddingue Bug report filed as requested — https://github.com/xcp-ng/xcp/issues/825 — and tagging @Team-Storage per your suggestion. Full evidence bundle is attached to the issue (versions, sweep output, vhd-util vs xe comparison, SMlog). Summary of what I found: One correction to the mechanism, and I think it matters. The recap describes is-a-snapshot being flipped to true. On my system that isn't what's happening — is-a-snapshot is false on every affected VDI. The field being wrongly written is snapshot-of, which is getting populated on base disks that aren't snapshots at all. XO's disappearing-disks symptom is consistent with either (it filters on a non-empty snapshot-of), but if the storage team is hunting for a bad is-a-snapshot write, that may be the wrong field. Every affected VDI here looks like: is-a-snapshot: false <-- correct snapshot-of: <populated with an unrelated VDI's UUID> <-- wrong A VDI that is a snapshot of itself. The clearest single artifact: uuid: 806f7f42-083f-4a40-b3f1-0700d00bab5a name-label: WinSrv2022SHB_Disk1_Data is-a-snapshot: false snapshot-of: 806f7f42-083f-4a40-b3f1-0700d00bab5a <-- itself snapshot-time: 20260709T11:19:15Z sm-config: vhd-parent: c86e3247-... <-- bears no relation to the snapshot-of value No valid code path produces snapshot-of = self. Whatever writes this field isn't validating the target. It's still actively corrupting new VDIs — this is not just legacy damage. That self-referential VDI was created 2026-07-09, a week after my patch + reboot. Sweeps 9 days apart went from ~180 → 191 affected VDIs on one SR, and a fourth anchor UUID appeared that didn't exist in the first sweep. Newly created VHDs keep landing in the affected set. So "stop it happening again" is the urgent half of the two-part fix, at least in my case. The bogus targets cluster onto a tiny anchor set, and the anchors point at each other: Count Anchor 97 937c3945 (→ a893fdb4) 50 a893fdb4 (→ ea150883) 37 ea150883 7 806f7f42 (→ itself, new since Jul 9) That looks less like corrupted lineage and more like the field being filled from an incorrect/uninitialised source. On-disk VHDs are completely healthy. vhd-util check says valid, parent locators are consistent, GC reports no work. The two VDIs the DB calls parent/child are, on disk, siblings under a common parent. The corruption is purely in the XAPI database — which is good news for recoverability. The VDI_IN_USE is not a real lock. current-operations is empty, xe task-list is empty, no tapdisk holds it. VM.start fails because it's walking a snapshot relationship that doesn't exist on disk. Reproduces from xe on the pool master with XO entirely out of the path — which is why I filed against xcp-ng/xcp rather than the XO tracker. Versions: XCP-ng 8.3.0, xapi 26.1.11 (xapi-core-26.1.11-1.2), sm-3.2.12-17.9, sm-fairlock-3.2.12-17.9, blktap 3.55.5-9.1, build 20260618. I have not attempted to bulk-clear the fields — on-disk data is intact and I'd rather not do a mass write against the XAPI DB on a live SR without guidance. Backing store snapshotted as a safety net. Happy to run whatever diagnostics would help. And +1 to the hand-grenade feeling — the affected set growing on its own is the part that worries me. Has this issue been validated on a storage server built around Debian 13, LVM and ext4 or just TrueNAS when connected to XCP-ng version 8.3.0. As part of the XAPI DB corruption. Can anyone answer this please or give a clue?
  • Our hyperconverged storage solution

    49 Topics
    765 Posts
    poddingueP
    The timing evidence here looks strong to me. Your second Grafana window is doing a lot of work: linstor-satellite.service jumps to roughly 8,700 log lines in the three minutes around the panic, well above linstor-controller at 926 and xapi at 460, and the priority chart goes red at the same moment. A backup that fans out volume creates and deletes across three replicas, landing on a DRBD race, fits what you are seeing. Throttling Velero should tell you a lot. If the crashes stop with clientQPS: 3 and itemBlockWorkerCount: 1, that narrows it to concurrency rather than anything about those particular volumes. For the logs question, a xen-bugtool --yestoall bundle from a host that has panicked is usually the thing people ask for first (https://docs.xcp-ng.org/troubleshooting/log-files), since it sweeps up the kernel side alongside the storage logs you already have in Loki. I don't know DRBD internals well enough to say which trace matters most, so it might be worth a mention to @Team-Storage. They can say what they actually need rather than have you guess, and a panic that reproduces on a schedule is a good deal easier for them to chase than most.
  • 36 Topics
    117 Posts
    B
    Merci beaucoup pour vos retours ! @nathanael-h : C'est l'étape suivante !!! J'ai découvert cluster API le mois dernier et j'ai déja testé sur d'autres plateforme ! ça déchire !!! Je ne savais pas qu'il y avait un support de XCP-ng ! Je finis ma série d'article pour une installation classique et je bascule sur cluster API ! @ataxyanetwork Merci pour ton repo. Je vais regarder ça